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lished version.] 
You’ve been battling a drinking problem, and – in the last few months – successfully. 
At a departmental reception, you show strength of will and again drink nothing, but a 
colleague accidentally spills some wine on your sleeve. When you’re back home, your 
partner – smelling the alcohol – believes you’re drinking again. Naturally, you are of-
fended: Not necessarily by something your partner does or says, or will do, or is even 
disposed to do, but by their belief about you, it’s their belief that hurts you, that you 
may resent, that you may be expecting an apology for .  1
 You are the only non-white guest in an up-scale social gathering, where almost 
all of the catering staff are non-whites. Some other guest takes a look at you, and asks 
for a drink, clearly taking you to be working for the caterer, because of your race. Nat-
urally, you are offended. And it’s not the action – asking for a drink – that offends you 
so much as it is the belief, and the inference on which it is based. That is what wrongs 
you, that is what they should be apologizing for .  2
 In these examples, then, it seems that beliefs wrong. And the booming litera-
ture on doxastic wrongdoing (and on moral encroachment) attempts to better under-
stand how it is that beliefs can morally wrong. In this paper, though, we argue that the 
appearances here should be resisted. Some neighboring thoughts can be saved. But de-
fenses of the full thought that beliefs in themselves can be a form of wrongdoing can-
not at the end of the day be defended. There is no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing.  
 In section 1 we do some cleaning up – precisifying both the examples and our 
thesis. In that section we also discuss – if in a somewhat preliminary way – the relation 
between doxastic wrongdoing and moral encroachment. In section 2 we argue against 
a fairly modest version of doxastic wrongdoing – focusing on Basu and Schroeder 
(2019). We argue that even if everything they say is correct, still they can’t accommo-
date crucial features of the underlying intuitions, and this gives reason to reject their 
account. We then proceed to discuss a more ambitious kind of (purported) doxastic 
wrongdoing – exemplified by some (but not all) of Basu’s relevant texts. We note some 
of the theoretical prices of going down that road as well, concluding that it too is inde-
fensible. This leaves us with the task of explaining – indeed, explaining away – the in-
tuitive force of the examples we started with. This is the task of the following two sec-
tions.  
1. Cleaning Up 
More than one thing may be problematic with the beliefs in the guiding examples (that 
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you are back drinking, that you work for the caterer), and not all of the ways in which 
they may be problematic are a matter of what is now often called doxastic wrongdoing. 
So we need to say more .  3
 One important point has already been hinted at above. What we want to focus 
on is the belief itself and whether it wrongs you. So we want to rule out all sorts of 
things that are related to the relevant beliefs in all sorts of ways, and that may wrong 
you. So: Perhaps some of the relevant actions wrong you (like if your partner ends the 
relationship because of (what they think is) your drinking). Perhaps some attitudes 
wrong you – either upstream from the relevant belief (like perhaps some racist attitude 
of the guest) or downstream from it (like if your partner blames you  or even just ex4 -
presses the belief). Perhaps some of the epistemic practices involved are wrong, and in-
deed wrong you: Perhaps, for instance, your partner owed it to you to hear your expla-
nation before forming a belief, perhaps the guest owed it to you to keep an open mind 
about a non-white being another guest, perhaps both had an obligation to invest more 
resources (time, attention, etc.) into evidence-gathering. All of this may be true, and 
we revisit some of these options below. But the underlying doxastic wrongdoing intu-
ition – the one doing work in the examples above – is not exhausted by such options. 
That intuition is about the belief itself wronging you.  
 Another important point about cases of (purported) doxastic wrongdoing is 
that the problems with the relevant beliefs are not merely that they are epistemically 
unjustified. This may be because some of the (purportedly) morally problematic beliefs 
are in fact epistemically (or if you prefer evidentially) justified. But even if this cannot 
be the case, even if morally problematic beliefs are guaranteed to be epistemically 
problematic as well, the moral problem is not exhausted by the epistemic one. Beliefs 
that are epistemically (or evidentially) on a par with those need not, in other words, 
also be morally problematic.  
 Relatedly, the duty arguably violated in cases of doxastic wrongdoing is a direc-
tional one: It is owed to someone. Your partner owes it to you not to believe that you’re 
back drinking, perhaps, and the other guest owes it to you – and maybe to other non-
whites, and maybe to all non-whites – not to take it for granted that they are not guests 
when present in a specific kind of social event. In both cases there is something per-
sonal, exemplified by the fact that your partner should arguably apologize to you for 
having wronged you. At least typically, a violation of an epistemic duty does not have 
similar consequences: If I proceed to commit an inferential fallacy, my belief in the 
conclusion is epistemically unjustified, and may be criticized. But typically there’s no 
one whom I wrong by committing the fallacy, and no one to whom I owe an apology 
for this violation.   
 Finally, it’s important to distinguish here between doxastic wrongdoing and 
moral encroachment. Moral encroachment – at least in its most plausible form – is the 
 Much of what we say here follows, at least to an extent, points made by Basu and Schroed3 -
er (2019). 
 Though there are, of course, interesting relations between believing and blaming. [Refer4 -
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view according to which the moral stakes may affect the degree of evidential support 
needed to secure a specific epistemic status for an attitude – typically, the status of jus-
tification or knowledge for all-out bivalent beliefs . According to such a view, for in5 -
stance, the significance of the question whether you’re drinking again to your relation-
ship with your partner raises the epistemic bar,  so that the evidence they must have to 6
be epistemically justified in believing that you’re back drinking is stronger (perhaps 
much stronger) than the evidence that would suffice for them to justifiably believe, say, 
that you’re back biting your fingernails (where the moral stakes, presumably are much 
lower).  
 We will not in this paper argue against all forms of moral encroachment , and 7
as is clear even just from the last paragraph, accepting moral encroachment can go at 
least some way towards accommodating the intuitions we started from, so it's impor-
tant to see how doxastic wrongdoing goes further than (at least this kind of) moral en-
croachment . First, in cases of doxastic wrongdoing (if there are any), the relevant 8
wrong is, as noted above, directional. But the standard way of thinking of moral en-
croachment – certainly the way that ties it most closely to pragmatic encroachment  – 9
is not similarly directional. What the high (moral) stakes do is make it the case that 
more by way of evidential support is needed for (e.g.) justified or rational belief. This 
story is not directional. Second, if all the high moral stakes do is raise the needed evi-
dential bar, then it's possible that the available evidence is good enough to clear even 
this higher bar. Perhaps, for instance, the evidence your partner needs in order to justi-
fiably believe that you’re back drinking is stronger than the evidence they need to justi-
fiably believe that you’re back biting your nails, but still, the available evidence may be 
strong enough even for that . In such cases, a moral encroachment view may not fully 10
accommodate the intuition we started with. A doxastic wrongdoing view may go fur-
 Or trivalent, in case you think that withholding is a third attitude. For details, distinctions 5
among different kinds of moral encroachment, and many references, see Bolinger (2020). 
 There are other mechanisms that can be posited to reach similar epistemic results. See, for 6
instance, Lewis (1996, 555-6) subject-sensitive “Rule of Belief ”.           
 [Reference omitted] 7
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 For the claim that moral encroachment is a particular instance of pragmatic encroach9 -
ment, see, for instance, Fritz, 2017; Worsnip (forthcoming). Fritz and Jackson (forthcoming) 
make a similar point restricted to just what they call moderate moral encroachment.
 Unless, that is, there’s room for an encroachment view that allows the stakes to raise the 10
threshold all the way to infinity. We think there is room in logical space for such a view, but 
we're not sure how plausible it is or how well it coheres with the motivations underlying moral 
encroachment, and anyway, we don’t know of anyone pursuing this kind of view.  
Views according to which rationality or justification – as applied to beliefs – is factive can 
also accommodate the point in the text, by insisting that no false belief (like the belief that 
you’re back drinking) can be justified or rational, whatever the evidence. See the debate be-
tween Williamson (2013) and Cohen and Comesãna’s (2013). We find the thought that a justi-
fied or rational belief cannot be false highly implausible. Some of what we say below will also 
be relevant to this kind of view.       
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ther, insisting that regardless of the strength of the evidence, your partner ought not 
believe that you’re back drinking (because they owe it to you not so to believe). For 
these reasons – and for others as well – we tend to agree with Bolinger (2020) when 
she says that moral encroachment (at least the more standard versions thereof) and 
doxastic wrongdoing are logically independent – neither entails the other. There will 
be more about the relation between doxastic wrongdoing and moral encroachment 
below. For now, though, this will do.  
 We are now better placed to be more specific and precise about what it is exact-
ly that we’ll be arguing for when we argue for the claim that there is no such thing as 
doxastic wrongdoing.  
First, it is important for us to emphasize that we fully feel the force of the intu-
itions that push in the direction of recognizing doxastic wrongdoing . We agree with 11
Basu and Schroeder (2019) that there’s something commonsensical about such 
thoughts that beliefs can and do wrong people; that people do and should apologize 
for beliefs; that people do and should expect such apologies. In other words, we con-
cede that if two theories are equally good in other terms, and only one of them ac-
commodates doxastic wrongdoing, this is a reason to accept that theory rather than 
the one that doesn’t. What we will be insisting on, however, is that other considerations 
make it the case that these intuitions – to the extent that they cannot be accounted for 
with deflationary explanations – should at the end of the day be discarded.   
 Second, by denying doxastic wrongdoing we do not deny, of course, that the 
host of actions and attitudes in the vicinity of beliefs – some of which mentioned 
above – may be governed by moral norms, and may therefore constitute wrongs. We 
agree that there may be circumstances in which one is morally required to make it the 
case that one is disposed to be less epistemically rational. We agree that the relation 
between epistemic rationality (more narrowly understood) and the good life is contin-
gent – it’s not a priori that being epistemically rational is always conducive to (or partly 
constitutive of) leading a good life . If virtue is constitutively tied to having a good 12
life, this means that we are also willing to accept that the relation between virtue and 
epistemic rationality more narrowly understood is contingent . We agree, of course, 13
that moral norms – including directional ones – may govern actions in the vicinity of 
beliefs, such as duties to invest resources in finding more evidence, or to act as if one 
does or does not believe . In fact, not only are all of these points compatible with 14
denying doxastic moral doing – they are instrumental to arguing for this claim, be-
cause as much of the relevant literature notes, they offer at least partial alternative ex-
planations of the relevant intuitive data. We return to this below.  
Third, if you want to attribute wrongdoing to beliefs as shorthand for attribut-
 We presented the initial examples in the second-person because this emphasizes, we 11
think, their intuitive appeal.
 In the opposite direction, we agree with Keller (2018) that on plausible conceptions of 12
wellbeing, what others believe of you may constitutively contribute to your wellbeing. 
 Preston-Roedder (2018) puts forward such claims in terms of virtue, the good life, and 13
epistemic irrationality, Arpaly and Brinkerhoff (2018) voice some relevant doubts. 
 A point emphasized in Enoch (2016). See also Bollinger (2020). 14
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ing wrongdoing to something in the vicinity of the belief – if you think that beliefs 
wrong in virtue of something else wronging – we have no objection to this way of 
speaking. If you want to say, for instance, that the wrongness of a failure to live up to 
one’s evidence-gathering duties transmits to the formed belief and makes it wrong 
(and indeed, makes it the case that it wrongs the relevant person), we have no objec-
tion to this way of speaking. What we deny is that beliefs themselves can non-deriva-
tively wrong, that beliefs can wrong no in virtue of something else wronging.  
Fourth, our discussion does not challenge doxastic wrongdoing from the out-
side, as it were, by insisting on doxastic involuntarism and that such involuntarism en-
tails that there is no doxastic wrongdoing , or by giving very general reasons to be15 -
lieve that there can be no practical reasons for belief . Rather, our discussion will be 16
almost entirely more internal, engaging the proponents of doxastic wrongdoing on 
their own terms, showing that they cannot plausibly get what they want.  
Lastly, our discussion will not, of course, be terminological. We will have little 
time for wondering whether some considerations merit the label “epistemic” or not. 
And for the most part we won’t even bother with the question whether a relevant con-
sideration amounts to being a reason of the right kind or of the wrong kind for a belief 
(though there will be exceptions below). Surely, the discussion of doxastic wrongdoing 
is more interesting than that.  
What are we insisting on, then, when we’re insisting that there’s no doxastic 
wrongdoing? Well, that there is a distinct, important, privileged mode of evaluation 
that applies to beliefs (and credences, and withholding of belief, and maybe 
inferences); that this mode of evaluation does not manifest the standard features of 
moral evaluation (re directionality, for instance, and the relation to rights and duties 
and apologies); that this mode of evaluation is indispensable from our theorizing 
about beliefs ; and that moral norms apply to beliefs, if at all, only derivatively , in 17 18
virtue of applying to other more practical things in the vicinity of the relevant beliefs.  
2. Against Modest Doxastic Wrongdoing 
It will be useful to distinguish between what we will call modest and ambitious doxastic 
wrongdoing views. Ambitious views accept – and modest ones do not – the possibility 
of a moral duty to believe contra to evidence . In other words, views that accept mod19 -
est doxastic wrongdoing agree that beliefs can wrong, and furthermore that such 
 See, for instance, the discussion in Basu and Schroeder (2019) and the references there. 15
 See, for instance, Berker (2018, and the references in footnote 22), Arpaly and Brinker16 -
hoff (2018, and the references in footnote 40). 
 Such an indispensability claim is central to Christensen (forthcoming). See also his 17
comment on terminology in footnote 33. 
 Though not put in those terms, we believe that Nolfi (2018) at the end of the day defends 18
only this kind of derivative wrongness for beliefs. 
 Bolinger (2020) suggests that the hope to avoid such a conflict between moral and epis19 -
temic duties is a central motivation for moral encroachment. If she’s right about this, this 
means that the gap between ambitious doxastic wrongdoing and moral encroachment is even 
more significant than noted in the previous section. 
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wrongness can be directional, but they insist that whenever they do, they are also epis-
temically unjustified – “Doxastic wrongs are all epistemically impermissible” (Basu 
and Schroeder 2019) . The more ambitious views allow for the possibility of an epis20 -
temically permissible, perhaps even epistemically required, doxastic wrong. They can 
allow, for instance, for a moral duty for your partner not to believe that you’re back 
drinking, even if that belief is epistemically justified. We discuss modest doxastic 
wrongdoing in this section, and ambitious doxastic wrongdoing in the next one . We 21
first focus on Basu and Schroeder’s (2019) modest view, and then generalize. 
How do Basu and Schroeder, then, explain the fact that your partner is wrong-
ing you by believing that you’re back drinking? First, they accept moral encroachment, 
so that the high moral stakes make it the case that the evidence needed for your part-
ner to be justified in having that belief is extra strong. Second, they think that your 
partner has a strong reason – grounded in the moral significance of your relationship – 
not to form that belief. Now, you may think that this kind of account allows for this 
moral reason – not to form a belief – to conflict with the epistemic duty to form this 
belief (if the evidence is sufficiently strong, perhaps strong enough to clear the higher 
bar in virtue of moral encroachment). But this, Basu and Schroeder insist, is not so. 
The moral reason not to form this belief is – so they say – a reason of the right kind  22
not to form a belief. Here they rely on claims defended by Schroeder in earlier work 
(e.g. 2012), according to which some reasons to withhold a belief – or not to form a 
belief – are not guilty of being reasons of the wrong kind. Schroeder believes, for in-
stance, that the fact that more evidence is coming soon is a reason of the right kind not 
to form a belief right now. If the moral reason your partner has not to form the belief 
that you’re back drinking is a right-kind reason to withhold that belief, then the doxas-
tic wrong (believing that you’re back drinking) is also epistemically impermissible. 
And, of course, if your partner commits this doxastic wrong, then given what makes it 
a wrong – say, something about your relationship – your partner is clearly wronging 
you. No wonder, then, that you expect an apology, precisely for the violation, that is, 
the belief. 
 A similar story can be told regarding the other leading example. The moral fea-
tures of the case – the history of racial oppression, the wrongness of the economical 
and occupational inequalities race is still correlated with, the harms of racial stereotyp-
ing – raise the threshold for justified belief (that this person is a waiter, say, and not a 
guest). And all of these considerations also give a moral reason – of the right kind – 
 Gardiner (2018, 191-2) also accepts that "if there is a moral mistake there is also an epis20 -
temic mistake". But she rejects moral encroachment (and also, presumably, doxastic wrongdo-
ing), because, as she explains, on her view in such cases the moral mistake is grounded in the 
epistemic mistake, and not the other way around. 
 It would be natural to think also that on modest views, true beliefs never amount to a 21
doxastic wrongdoing, whereas ambitious views leave room for true beliefs to amount to doxas-
tic wrongdoing. But to derive this from the distinction as it is put in the text auxiliary premises 
will be needed.  
 For general discussions of the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem, see, for instance, Rabi22 -
nowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) and Hieronymi (2005).
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not to form that belief. So forming that belief is both morally and epistemically wrong.  
 For the sake of argument, we are going to grant Basu and Schroeder all of the 
details here – the moral encroachment line, even the claims about the reasons to with-
hold beliefs here being reasons of the right kind . Still, the modest view gives us much 23
less than we are intuitively after.  
 Suppose that you come home smelling like red wine, and your partner – while 
falling short of believing that you’re back drinking, still proceeds to become much 
more confident that you’re back drinking. Suppose that before tonight, their credence 
that you’re back drinking was very low, around .1, but that now, smelling the wine, 
they’re about .8 confident that you’re off the wagon. How much better do you feel? 
Perhaps the situation is not as bad as in the case in which your partner believes that 
you’re back drinking, but it’s still pretty bad. You may, for instance, expect them to 
apologize even just for this significant change in credences . Indeed, it seems to us 24
clear that the objection to the rise in credence is just the same objection (though per-
haps somewhat attenuated in force) to the belief that you’re back drinking. So an ade-
quate account of doxastic wrongdoing must accommodate this case as well. But it’s 
hard to see how Basu and Schroeder’s account can do that. It’s very hard to find sup-
port in the pragmatic and moral encroachment literature for encroachment on cre-
dences, and with good reason, it seems . So it doesn’t seem that the first part of Basu 25
and Schroeder’s apparatus – moral encroachment – can help with the credence version 
of the case. Nor is it clear that the second part – the right-kind-reason not to form a 
belief at all – applies to the credence case. It’s not at all clear that a plausible case can be 
made for a right-kind-reason not to update credence in the face of probabilistically rel-
evant evidence: It’s one thing to say that there’s a moral reason not to form a belief, 
quite another to say that there’s a moral reason to stay with a credence that fails to take 
into account relevant evidence . 26
 Or suppose that your partner, while falling short of forming the belief that 
you’re back drinking, nevertheless forms the hedged belief that you’re probably back 
drinking. Again, the intuitive objection seems to be the same one as in the original 
case (won’t you expect an apology? If the guest at the social gathering only believes 
 It is quite a lot that we’re granting here for the sake of argument. In particular, Schroed23 -
er’s account of the distinction between reasons of the right and of the wrong kind is far from 
obvious or uncontroversial. If it fails, Basu and Schroederf ’s modest view falls along with it.  
For the claim that what he calls radical moral encroachment lacks the resources to distin-
guish between the kind of moral considerations it declares epistemically relevant and para-
digmatically wrong-kind reasons for belief, see Fritz (forthcoming).
 [Reference omitted]. See also Fritz and Jackson (forthcoming), who develop in more de24 -
tails very similar themes. Their discussion is couched in terms of moral encroachment rather 
than doxastic wrongdoing, but the main point is the one we’re making here. 
 For a similar characterization of the literature, and for many references, see Bolinger 25
(2020), Worsnip (forthcoming) and Fritz and Jackson (forthcoming). 
 In correspondence in a related context, [omitted] suggested that going for imprecise cre26 -
dences can be of use in some such cases. We are skeptical that imprecise credences can give the 
modest theorist all that she needs here.  
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that you probably work for the caterer, is everything ok?) . But it is again not clear that 27
Basu and Schroeder’s account can accommodate this: Given some plausible assump-
tions about the relation between credences regarding p and belief that probably p , the 28
discussion from the previous paragraph applies.  
 Finally, note that you may want more from your partner than merely not to 
believe that you’re back drinking. You may want them to positively believe that you’re 
not back drinking . And if they don’t, the phenomenology is again similar: You may 29
be offended, you may seek an apology (for the failure to believe that you’re not back 
drinking), and so on. Again, the intuitions underlying the thought that your partner is 
wronging you by failing to believe you’re still strong are the very same intuitions un-
derlying the initial thought, namely, that they’re wronging you by believing that you’re 
off the wagon . But Basu and Schroeder’s account cannot accommodate the intuitions 30
in this case: the thought about right-kind reasons to withhold beliefs is clearly irrele-
vant, and while it’s not entirely implausible to think that your partner has a moral rea-
son to believe you’re not back drinking (in virtue of the value of the relationship, say), 
it would be a huge stretch to declare those reasons of the right kind for that belief. In 
that case, all the weight is placed on the moral encroachment part of the view, but this 
gives rise to two problems. First, as noted above, it’s not at all clear that moral en-
croachment can ground the full (purported) phenomenon of doxastic wrongdoing. 
For instance, directionality may be lost. Second, it’s not clear that moral encroachment 
can work here either. Usually, moral encroachers think of the high stakes of believing 
falsely as raising the relevant epistemic threshold. Whether they are – or should be – 
willing to think of the high stakes of failing to believe truly as lowering the relevant 
epistemic threshold is highly controversial . If there are powerful reasons not to go 31
down that road, then, nothing about moral encroachment can save the thought that 
your partner owes it to you to believe that you’re not back drinking (and indeed, 
maybe to believe you, a point we return to below).  
 Basu and Schroeder’s modest view, then, can’t accommodate cases in which 
what seems intuitively wrong is not just having the relevant belief, but also raising the 
relevant credence, having the hedged belief (that probably so-and-so), or failing to 
 For similar points see Gardiner (2018, 179), Fritz and Jackson (forthcoming). 27
 Dorst (2019), [References omitted], Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (2016), Roth28 -
schild (2020). For the contrary view, see Moss (2019) and Williamson (forthcoming).    
 There are structural similarities between the move in the text here and Worsnip’s (forth29 -
coming) version of a Pascal Wager case where what leads, if God exists, to eternal damnation 
is not failing to believe in Him, but positively believing that He doesn’t exist.
 If you’re not convinced, suppose that your partner is “on the fence” regarding whether or 30
not you’re off the wagon, not in the sense of not having considered the issue, but in the more 
active sense of having thought about it and come down, as it were, equi-distant from a positive 
and a negative judgment here. Surely, the intuitions about the appropriateness of apology etc. 
at least carry over to this case, right? But Basu and Schroeder seem unable to accommodate 
this case either. 
 See Bolinger’s (2020) distinction between robust and cautious moral encroachment, and 31
the references there. 
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have some other belief. And while we don’t have an argument clearly establishing that 
this result generalizes, this does seem like a plausible hypothesis at this stage. Because 
some of these other responses (the credence, the hedged belief, the absence of a belief) 
seem very well supported by the evidence, it’s hard to see how any modest doxastic 
wrongdoing view – that asserts the impossibility of an epistemically permissible doxas-
tic wrong – can accommodate these other cases . 32
 Now, merely not accommodating some cases need not be a fatal flaw in a theo-
ry, if it accommodates some other (central) cases. But the situation for modest views is 
more serious than mere incompleteness, for a reason we’ve been emphasizing 
throughout: The intuitive data is not just that your partner seems to be wronging you 
in all these cases (the credence case, the hedged belief case, the positive belief case). 
Rather, the intuitive data is that it’s the same thing that’s going on in all of these cases. 
So we seek a unified explanation for all of them. At the very least, a theory that offers a 
unified explanation of all these cases is much better for it. So the fact that Basu and 
Schroeder’s explanation – and perhaps any other modest one – cannot be applied to 
these other cases is a strong reason to think that it’s not the right thing to say even 
about the limited scope of cases to which it does apply.  
 Perhaps the way forward, then, is to go ambitious.  
3. Against Ambitious Doxastic Wrongdoing 
The more ambitious – and in a way, also more straightforward – way of accepting dox-
astic wrongdoing is by allowing for the possibility of conflict between what is epistemi-
cally required and what is morally required . Such a view can allow for the thought 33
that your partner ought not to believe that you’re off the wagon – that they owe it to 
you not so to believe – even if the evidence epistemically calls for such a belief. It will 
allow for the thought that, say, the moral duties of friendship sometimes require that 
friends be epistemically irrational (say, in responding to evidence that their friend has 
behaved shamefully) . Also, at least on the face of things, ambitious doxastic wrong34 -
 Paul and Morton (2018a) put forward a kind of modest doxastic wrongdoing view, 32
though one focusing on beliefs about oneself. Paul and Morton (2018b) extend their account 
to the case of beliefs about others. The central role epistemic permissiveness plays in their ac-
count means that our objections in the text do not, as stated, apply to their view. In terms of 
their account, what our points in the text show is just how (implausibly) wide the permissive-
ness they are committed to is.
 Basu endorses ambitious doxastic wrongdoing in some – but not all – of her texts on the 33
topic. See especially Basu (forthcoming). Marusic (2015) endorses an ambitious view, though 
somewhat restricted in scope to the special cases of beliefs about one's own future actions 
when one promises or resolves to act in some way, and the evidence shows it's unlikely that 
they will. We will be focusing on inter-personal cases, so we won't be discussing Marusic's 
view further. But the arguments we present against Basu-style doxastic wrongdoing apply, mu-
tatis mutandis, to Marusic's as well. 
 Stroud (2006) mentions this possibility, though she stops short of endorsing it. See also 34
Keller (2003). These papers were written long before moral encroachment and doxastic 
wrongdoing became a thing, so the terms are somewhat different. But they clearly anticipate 
many of the moves in this literature since. Keller (2018) revisits these issues. 
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doing can apply – unlike its modest counterpart – to the cases of credences, hedged 
beliefs, and a purported requirement to believe (rather than just to avoid believing).  
 Still, we think that the ambitious view too ultimately fails. It has, we proceed to 
argue, problematic implications having to do with the moral-epistemological conflict, 
with a failure of transparency, and with self-defeat and contingency.  
3.1. The Moral-Epistemological Conflict  
The first thing to note here, of course, is that accepting a conflict between moral and 
epistemic duties is already a cost. Perhaps at the end of the day – on the strength of 
other evidence – we’re going to have to live with this cost. But at the very least, when 
two theories are equally good in other terms, the one that does not invoke such a con-
flict should be preferred to the one that does. (Surely, it is not coincidence that some 
people friendly to doxastic wrongdoing try to avoid such conflict by going modest.)  
 More needs to be said here, because not all conflicts between norms are prob-
lematic in this way. We are accustomed to conflicts between prima-facie or pro-tanto 
duties, or to different values and reasons pulling in different directions. It is not a 
shortcoming in a theory that it allows for such conflicts. Also, we’re quite accustomed 
to conflicts between systems of norms: Perhaps, for instance, in some circumstances it’s 
legally required that I obey my officer’s order, and it’s morally required that I disobey . 35
Or perhaps there are circumstances in which the rules of baseball require that the um-
pire call a runner safe, but some other norms require that the runner be declared out . 36
But the case of the moral-epistemological conflict to which the ambitious view is 
committed seems importantly different from both of these mundane cases. Both moral 
and epistemic judgments seem to be all-things-considered-ish judgments. There may, 
of course, be conflicts of the first kind, between different pro-tanto moral duties, or 
between pieces of evidence pulling in opposite directions, within each of the two do-
mains. But once all of those are factored in, both morality and epistemology seem to 
claim all-things-considered authority. So modeling the conflict between moral and 
epistemic norms on the conflict between pro-tanto duties or reasons or values does not 
seem promising. And what allows the second kind of conflict – between morality on 
one side, and the law or the rules of baseball on the other – is the fact that the law and 
baseball are (arguably) normative only in a minimal, institutional sense. In terms that 
 On some jurisprudential theories, this is not possible. So much the worse, we think, for 35
those theories. For some relevant discussion, see Enoch (2011). 
  “It’s fair to say my umpiring beginnings were modest. My first game was a Little League 36
contest; I was on the bases. And my first call of any consequence I got wrong on purpose. The 
team at bat had scored a dozen or so runs in the third inning, largely because the first baseman 
had dropped three perfectly good throws, and with the score something like 20-1, the poor kid 
finally held on to one. The runner, however, had beaten the throw by a stride and a half. I did 
my job. ‘He’s out’ I bellowed. The reactions were interesting… My partner, one of the league’s 
regular umpires, stared daggers of disgust in my direction and didn’t talk to me for the rest of 
the game… Afterward, the coach of the winning team came over and shook my hand and 
winked at me. ‘Nice job on that call,’ he said.” Weber (2009, 113-4). [Acknowledgment 
omitted.] 
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are sometimes used in the literature, they are merely formally, not robustly 
normative . But both morality and epistemology are (arguably) robustly normative, 37
they are genuinely reason-giving or reason-stating, they are not institutional. Again, 
then, this model won’t save the ambitious theorist from the costs involved in accepting 
a moral-epistemological conflict.  
Of course, what we just said about these two models of mundane conflict may 
be contested, so that perhaps they can help the ambitious theorist after all. Or perhaps 
there are also other models of acceptable conflicts between norms, models that more 
closely resemble what the ambitious theorist wants to defend. So we don’t pretend the 
argument here is conclusive. Still, the ambitious theorist at least owes us more details, 
and seems to be paying a price in plausibility here.  
3.2. Transparency  38
Suppose you are the friend from Stroud’s (2006) example . Suppose you are conscien39 -
tious and reflective, so you reflect not just on whether or not your friend behaved 
shamefully, but also on whether or not you should believe that they did. What story 
should you be telling yourself? The point we want to highlight here is that it’s going to 
be very hard to tell yourself the story that the ambitious theory says is true here. Try 
thinking “Well, clearly the evidence shows that they behaved shamefully, and epistemi-
cally this is what I should believe. Still, I refuse to do so, on moral grounds.” It’s not 
clear that this is even a possible thought for you to think – it gives a feel of incoher-
ence, perhaps of the kind involved in (some versions of) Moore’s paradox. And the fol-
 See McPherson (2011), Enoch (2019) for the distinction in the text. Parfit (2011) calls 37
formal normativity “normativity in the rule implying sense” and robust normativity “norma-
tivity in the reason implying sense”. 
Formal normativity has to do with criteria of correctness. Pretty much any system of rules 
can generate formal normativity – like the rules of games, even silly games no one has a reason 
to play (“From now on, all sentences must have a prime number of words.”). One can recog-
nize that the rules of such a silly game are formally normative without in any way endorsing 
them or the game. And it’s no criticism of someone’s actions that they violate those rules – un-
less, that is, that person has a reason to play that game. Robust normativity is different: It’s not 
just a matter of criteria of correctness, but roughly, the kind of correctness conditions that 
merit our allegiance, and furthermore that their meriting our allegiance does not depend on 
our wanting or having a prior, independent reason to engage the relevant “game”. 
 A terminological clarification: The term transparency is sometimes used to pick out a 38
general property of beliefs – namely, roughly, that when one asks oneself whether one should 
believe p, one immediately asks oneself whether p. Sometimes, this kind of transparency is 
invoked in arguments for evidentialism or against any practical reasons for belief. See, for in-
stance, Shah (2006). Our use of the term “transparency” is more restricted – as we proceed to 
explain in the text, it applies specifically to the question whether the relevant believer can co-
herently believe the ambitious doxastic wrongdoing story. 
 Of course, friendships come in different shapes and forms, and this applies to their (pur39 -
ported) epistemic significance as well. We don’t think that friends are in general required to 
believe their friends, or to resist evidence of their wrongdoing. What we’re going along with 
Stroud about is that there are some friendship cases that intuitively fit her characterization, not 
that all are.   
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lowing is even worse, indeed quite clearly Mooreanly incoherent: “Well, I believe they 
didn’t act shamefully, but my evidence clearly says I’m mistaken.”  So on an ambitious 40
account, it’s going to be very hard – perhaps impossible – to both believe as one moral-
ly ought, and to be fully reflective (and correct) about the epistemic and moral status 
of one’s belief . Notice that the problems gets worse still if the ambitious theorist 41
wants to accommodate the points about credences from the previous section. Depend-
ing on the details of the view, the ambitious theorist may find herself committed to 
such clearly Moorean judgments as “My evidence requires that I be confident they be-
haved shamefully, but I insist on being confident they did not.” 
 This too is not a conclusive objection, because the ambitious theorist may re-
ject transparency as a desideratum here. The ambitious theorist may, in other words, 
accept the result that believing as one morally ought to requires not being fully reflec-
tive (and correct) about the nature of what one is doing. And we want to concede that 
this is a possible move. But if this is the only way an ambitious theorist can avoid 
Moorean incoherence, the stakes have certainly been raised.  
 Now, it’s not as if the friend from Stroud’s example has to be incoherent. Per-
haps they should be understood not as believing or attempting to believe directly for 
moral reasons, but rather as responding to the friendship-related moral reasons in 
other ways. Perhaps, for instance, they can – and are morally required to – leave the 
room when someone starts speaking ill of their friend. Perhaps they can even try to 
make themselves less epistemically rational (by conditioning themselves to uncritically 
believe whatever their friends tell them). Such indirect measures may, of course, be 
governed by moral considerations , and agents may respond to them in a fully trans42 -
parent, reflective way, without any incoherence (Moorean or otherwise). But even if a 
belief that results from a violation of such moral considerations amounts to a wrong, it 
does so in a merely derivative way, and so does not give the ambitious theorist what 
she wants.  
3.3. Self-Defeat and Contingency 
In a telling moment in her (forthcoming), Rima Basu engages a criticism from Jennifer 
 A related problem: Suppose your partner is a philosopher. If they say “Look, the evidence 40
clearly supports the belief that you’re back drinking, and epistemically this is what I should 
believe. But because of the value of our relationship I believe that you’re not back drinking.”, 
are you happy? Won’t you be expecting an apology for the first part of this statement (and be-
lief)?  
See also the discussion of wishes and what it is we really want when we want our loved ones 
not to believe of us, below in section 5. 
 On some views of the distinction between right-kind and wrong-kind reasons, this alone 41
may show that the moral reasons for belief are not of the right kind. Joseph Raz (2009) sug-
gests (using somewhat different terminology) that what is characteristic of right-kind reasons 
to phi is that it’s possible to phi for those reasons. The transparency failure in the text here 
shows, it seems, that one cannot believe for the moral reasons. (One can, of course, indirectly 
respond to such reasons, as is the case with wrong-kind reasons in general, a point we return 
to in the text.)  
 A point emphasized in Enoch (2016). 42
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Saul. Saul (2018) argues that accepting conflicts between the epistemic and the moral 
(and so, in our terms, accepting ambitious doxastic wrongdoing) is counterproductive 
politically, because (perhaps among other things) it plays into the hands of unfair criti-
cisms of political correctness . Suppose that Saul is factually right in her warning. 43
Still, a natural reply, we would have thought, would be to insist on the reality of ambi-
tious doxastic wrongdoing, on the truth of the thesis that it is real, on the strength of 
the arguments and evidence for this thesis. Even if it is politically counterproductive to 
believe a thesis, it seems natural to respond to Saul, this is no (right-kind) reason at all 
not to believe it (it may be a reason not to shout the thesis from the rooftops, or even 
not to publish the papers arguing for it, but this is different, of course). Yet Basu does 
not respond in this way. Instead, Basu claims that Saul’s warning is exaggerated, that 
the danger she sees is not real.  
 It’s no coincidence, of course, that Basu avoids the natural response. Given her 
endorsement of ambitious doxastic wrongdoing, she cannot consistently respond in 
that way. True, that accepting doxastic wrongdoing is counterproductive politically (if 
it is) is not evidence that doxastic wrongdoing isn’t real. But it may still be a moral rea-
son to believe it isn’t real, and this, on this view, may be enough. In other words, ac-
cepting ambitious doxastic wrongdoing turns out to be contingently self-defeating. If 
Saul is factually right in her warning – clearly a contingent matter – then Basu’s own 
ambitious theory entails that we should not (all things considered) believe her theory. 
While this falls short of logical self-defeat (the theory entails not its falsity but rather 
that it shouldn’t be believed), it is still an unwelcome result.  
 Of course, Basu may insist – as she does – that Saul’s contingent warning is not 
actually true. In that case, her theory does not defeat itself in the actual world (at least 
not as far as Saul’s warning is concerned). But it remains self-defeating in fairly close 
worlds, and this seems bad enough. Basu may proceed to bite the bullet, conceding 
that her theory shouldn’t be believed in those worlds, and indeed, that it remains open 
whether it should be believed in the actual world – this depends on other possible con-
sequences of believing this theory, as well as on other (not consequences-based) moral 
characteristics of so believing. But this makes the answer to the question whether we 
should accept Basu’s theory (according to Basu’s theory itself!) highly contingent, and 
furthermore contingent on what seem to be the wrong things.  
 This concludes, then, our direct argument against doxastic wrongdoing: Theo-
ries supporting doxastic wrongdoing are either modest or ambitious, and there are 
strong reasons to reject each of these two options. But this leaves the initial cases – 
where it does seem like your partner wrongs you by believing that you’re back drink-
ing, and that the guest wrongs you by believing that you work for the caterer (based on 
your race) – unaccounted for. We are committed to rejecting these intuitions, for the 
reasons in this section and the previous one. Given the strength of those intuitions, 
though, a debunking explanation is called for. It is to this that we now turn.  
   
 See also Gardiner (2018, 187, fn 37). 43
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4. Debunking the Underlying Intuitions: Statistical Generalizations 
We start with cases based on statistical generalizations, because those seem easier to 
explain. The reason for this, at a first approximation, is that probabilistic reasoning is 
tricky . 44
 Distinguish the following propositions:  
(i) Almost all guests here are white. Almost all employees here are non-white.  
(ii) For an arbitrarily picked non-white here, it’s unlikely that they are a guest.  
(iii) This person (pointing at you, a non-white) is unlikely to be a guest.  
(iv) This person (pointing at you, a non-white) is not a guest.  
Now, we’re going to be assuming the truth of (i). Furthermore, we’re going to assume 
that there need be nothing problematic in believing (i), when the evidence clearly in-
dicates its truth, and that such a belief may very well amount to certainty or (common) 
knowledge. (If convincing is needed – think of those who may be committed to chang-
ing this situation. They must first believe that the situation calls for change, precisely 
because of the fact captured in (i) .) As for (ii): At least on one reading of “arbitrarily” 45
and “unlikely”, (ii) trivially follows from (i). Thus read, then, there’s no problem either 
with (ii)’s truth or with justifiably believing (and indeed knowing) it . The crucial 46
thing for our purposes is to see how even on these assumptions – and even restricting 
ourselves to purist, traditionally epistemological considerations – it is very hard to jus-
tify a belief in (iv), or even in (iii).  
 In order to move from (ii) to (iii), what is needed is the thought that you are a 
typical member of the relevant reference class, or that you have been chosen not mere-
ly arbitrarily, but randomly. But it is usually very hard to establish such a claim, and 
very easy to challenge it . The mere absence of information indicating a-typicality falls 47
far short of establishing typicality.  And the belief that you are a typical member of the 48
relevant reference class typically does very poorly in terms of stability or resilience – it 
is hyper-sensitive to possibly incoming countervailing evidence . What this means is 49
 Similar lines of criticism are developed in Gardiner (2018), Begby (2018), and Osborne 44
(forthcoming). See Basu (2019) for attempts at rejecting accounts of statistical generalizations 
cases that avoid a commitment to doxastic wrongdoing. 
 A consideration emphasized by Gardiner (2018, 182). 45
 There may be a different reading of (ii) that renders the transition from (ii) to (iii) close to 46
trivial. But on such a reading, the transition from (i) to (ii) is anything but trivial. 
 Even an initially random procedure fails to guarantee randomness. Think of telephone 47
polling where 500 numbers were randomly selected from a database. Still, in many cases the 
responses will not have been chosen randomly – say, depending on the time of day in which 
calls are made (and who is more likely to pick up at that time), who has more than one num-
ber in the database, and so on.
 There are well known problems with unrestricted versions of a principle of indifference 48
of the kind needed for no evidence of a-typicality to suffice as evidence here.  
For some puzzles having to do with this epistemological phenomenon see Karlander and 
Spectre (2010) and references there (e.g. the “Two Boys” problem).       
 For discussion in a relevant context, see Bolinger (forthcoming). See James Joyce (2005) 49
and references their as well as Leitgeb (2017).
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that it is going to be very hard to justify – in traditional, purely epistemic terms – a be-
lief such as (iii), even assuming (i) and (ii) . And even assuming a justified belief in 50
(iii), the inference to (iv) is anything but trivial, and will often be unjustified (again, 
even on a traditional, purely epistemic conception of justification). One clear way of 
seeing that the move from (i) to (iv) is epistemically problematic – wherever exactly 
the problem occurs between (i) and (iv) – is to notice that it doesn’t seem to transmit 
knowledge (even when (iv) is true), as the literature on lottery paradoxes and on statis-
tical evidence makes rather clear .  51
 What this means is that in order to explain why beliefs like (iii) and (iv) are 
problematic, there’s no need to go further than good, old-fashioned purist epistemolo-
gy. Basu (2019) sometimes writes as if the more traditional, morality-free epistemolo-
gy doesn’t have the resources to reach such a conclusion, but she may have this impres-
sion because of a failure to clearly distinguish between (i) and maybe (ii) – on which 
purist epistemology may look favorably but which are not intuitively problematic ei-
ther, and (iii) and (iv) – which are intuitively problematic, but which are (often) con-
demned by purist epistemology as well .  52
 Still, this may not be enough to fully explain (even debunkingly) the intuitions 
about the case. For these intuitions seem to indicate that beliefs such as (iii) and (iv) 
are morally problematic, not (or not merely) epistemically problematic, and further-
more, in a directional way.  
 What gives rise to the strong feeling that there’s something morally (and not 
merely epistemically) problematic about such beliefs is, we want to suggest, the racist 
attitudes that often partly explain the relevant epistemic failure. Why is it, it is natural 
to ask, that the guest was so quick to take it for granted that you’re a typical member of 
the class of non-whites here? Why is it this feature – rather than many others – that 
was so salient to him or her? Why didn’t they invest more time and attention into get-
 This is an important result, seeing that believing (iii) – or its cousin “This person is prob50 -
ably not a guest” – is already arguably offensive. 
 Further conditions may also be needed for a justified transition from (ii) to (iii) and (iv). 51
Perhaps, for instance, it’s also necessary that the reference class be projectable. We seem to take 
such inferences more seriously when the relevant class seems projectable, or to capture some-
thing of significance (say, about the chances of the obese to suffer from serious CoVid-19 
symptoms) than when they seem random (say, about the chances of people born on weekends 
to suffer such symptoms). 
 In other examples (though less so in the example based on Gendler’s Cosmos Club) yet 52
another type of judgment is relevant. Consider, for instance, “Ashkenazi Jews are poor tippers” 
[reference omitted]; Basu (2019) discusses the judgment that blacks are poor tippers). This is a 
generic statement, and it’s not at all clear how best to understand generics, or – consequently – 
what is needed to justify them inferentially. Because what is said in the text suffices to show 
how epistemically problematic (iii) and (iv) will usually be, we think we can avoid discussing 
here the further complications introduced by generics. Note, though, that for many of the cas-
es of racist (and similar) generalizations, the case of generics is going to be highly relevant, and 
the epistemic problems with justifying generics will then be able to accommodate at least to an 
extent the problematic nature of those beliefs.  
For discussions of generics in our context, see Begby (2018). 
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ting more information? Often, what explains all of this are some racist attitudes – even 
if somewhat subtle or implicit – that the guest has. Their sensitivity to some kinds of 
evidence and less to others may be explained by being disposed to believe, say, in a way 
that justifies, or anyway takes for granted, racially biased division of labor. Such atti-
tudes, of course, are morally problematic. And the fact that the guest comes to believe 
as they do in virtue of such morally objectionably attitudes explains why the belief it-
self seems immoral .  53
 Which leaves directionality. What explains the strong intuition that when the 
guest infers that you work for the caterer from your being non-white, they are not just 
inferring and believing problematically, but also wronging you?  We want to offer here 54
two related points. First, the duties in the vicinity of belief may be straightforwardly 
directional. Thus, in Stroud’s example, it seems clear that a friend may owe it to his 
friend to listen to him, to invest resources in coming up with exonerating explanations, 
indeed to leave the room when people start reporting the friend’s shameful behavior. 
The same seems true, suitably qualified, for the case of statistical generalizations. Per-
haps the guest owes it to you not to stop their evidence-gathering too soon. In such 
cases, if a violation occurs, it’s not the believing itself that is a directional wrong. But 
it’s close – something epistemic leading up to (and maybe also following) the belief is, 
and this explains, at least in part, the tendency to see the belief itself as not only wrong, 
but also wronging you . Second, and relatedly, even if the problematic nature of the 55
belief itself is not directional, still its potential harm may affect some more than others. 
Thus, while epistemic failures (say, proceeding uncritically from (ii) to (iii)) are not 
directional, the belief reached in this epistemically indefensible way may be more 
harmful, or more potentially harmful, for you – a non-white guest – than for others: It 
may humiliate you, or embarrass you, or diminish you . If so, even though the belief 56
itself doesn’t wrong you (because there’s no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing), still 
something close is going on – the belief harms you, and is (independently) unjusti-
 What about cases – surely possible – where the epistemic mistakes highlighted in the text 53
occur without the causal influence of the moral failures in the text? In those cases, we submit, 
the thought that there’s something morally problematic about the relevant beliefs loses much 
of its intuitive force. 
 For the record, we’re not sure that in cases of beliefs based on statistical generalizations 54
it’s as clear that the relevant duties are directional as it is in cases of interpersonal relations 
(which we proceed to discuss in the next section). 
 And following our promise in section 1, if you want to describe this situation in terms of 55
the belief being directionally wrong in virtue of something else being directionally wrong, we 
won’t fight you over these words. 
 Schroeder (forthcoming) talks in terms of diminishing in order to motivate thoughts of 56
moral encroachment and (modest) doxastic wrongdoing. We reject doxastic wrongdoing, of 
course, but we can still accept Schroeder’s normative intuition here, and accommodate it in the 
way in the text, without endorsing doxastic wrongdoing (or his interpretative account of per-
sons). 
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fied . And the two points in this paragraph are related because if a negligently formed 57
belief is expected to harm someone specific, the believer may owe it especially to them 
to conduct their epistemic affairs in a more careful way.  
 Now, had we offered these explanations as an attempt to fully vindicate the in-
tuitions about doxastic wrongdoing, they would not have sufficed. But it is not in this 
spirit that we offer them, for there is no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing, as we’ve 
argued. We offer these as explanations of why it is that we seem to have – to the extent 
that we do – the doxastic wrongdoing intuitions . And with this in mind, the explana58 -
tions in this section pull enough weight, we submit: They save something close to the 
phenomenon of doxastic wrongdoing, and explain why we seem to have the intuitions 
that want more, in a way that takes away these intuitions’ probative value.  
5. Debunking the Underlying Intuitions: Interpersonal Relationships  59
But the case of interpersonal relationships and their epistemic significance runs deep-
er, it seems. This is because within the context of interpersonal relationships, denying 
doxastic wrongdoing introduces a disturbing mismatch between what (if anything) is 
problematic in the interaction, and some of our deepest relevant concerns.   
To see this, think again about Stroud’s example of friendship and epistemic 
partiality: Your friend may, of course, want you not to act on a belief that he has acted 
shamefully. But even if no such action is relevant, it may very well be deeply important 
to him that you not have that belief – just like it's important for you that your partner 
not believe that you're back drinking. So the thought that in the relevant case there’s 
nothing morally wrong with the belief itself creates a mismatch between moral norms 
and what we care most deeply about .   60
 At the end of the day we insist that this is a result we’re just going to have to live 
with. What we do in the rest of the section is to show how this result is less troubling 
than may have been thought. We do this, first, by showing how a deeper phenomeno-
logical characterization of the concerns here may lead to questioning their coherence, 
and second, by commenting on the relation between believing something of the rele-
vant person and believing them.  
Return, then, to the friend from Stroud’s example: Damning evidence about his 
shameful behavior starts to accumulate, and it seems that he can quite sensibly care 
not just about what you do about it, but also about what you believe of him. But: what 
exactly does he care most about here? Suppose you avoid believing that he behaved 
 At one point Basu (forthcoming) seems to conflate the question whether something 57
wrongs you with the question whether something harms you: “It seems odd to say that no 
moral wrong is done, after all, people have died.”
 Some of Osborne’s (forthcoming) points are close to the ones in this section (we don’t 58
endorse, though, his expressivist notion of regard). But note that he thinks his explanations 
suffice to fully explain and vindicate the doxastic wrongdoing intuitions. We offer them in the 
more modest spirit described in the text. 
 [Reference omitted.]59
 This is a consideration emphasized by Marusic and White (2018). What we proceed to 60
say in the text, we think, can be seen as a reply to them as well. 
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shamefully by ignoring all the evidence. Is he likely to be satisfied? In some cases, of 
course. But in more typical cases, we think, a negative answer is much more 
plausible . In more typical cases, he seems to want more: He seems to want that you 61
believe well of him based on the evidence. We can even imagine him saying something 
along these lines: “I don’t want you to just ignore the evidence out of loyalty. What I 
really want is for you to have a hard look at the evidence, and then see that I did not 
act shamefully!” At least in cases in which he did not in fact act shamefully  (and 62
knows as much), he is unlikely to be satisfied with you ignoring the evidence. This is a 
phenomenological point, so play along: What would you have wanted your friend to 
do and believe had the false suspicion of shameful behavior been about you? Would 
you have been satisfied with them ignoring the evidence?   63
As a phenomenological characterization, then, this seems rather robust. But at 
this point it’s not clear how this concern can be made rational: If your friend wants you 
to believe well of him based on the evidence, then a part of what he wants is that the 
evidence support the belief that he did not act shamefully. And while it makes sense to 
have an attitude of this kind, this attitude is not one that is directly about you and your 
friendship, or even about your belief, nor is it clear that it is a practical attitude – a se-
rious desire or preference – at all. Rather, at this point it looks like a mere wish – the 
practically irrelevant relative of a desire or a practical concern.  
A comparison may help. Many people deeply want to be found attractive by 
others (or by some specific others). If they are not, this may be deeply disappointing 
for them, it may have considerable effects on their wellbeing, and so on. And notice 
that this is not just about actions. It's not just that people may want others to behave as 
if they are attracted to them – though they may want that as well. Many people care 
deeply about others being attracted to them, independently (to an extent) of implica-
tions to actions. But this doesn’t mean that there's any moral flaw in not being attract-
ed to them . And while it makes perfect sense for them to wish things would have 64
been otherwise, this is all it would be – a mere wish, not a serious desire or preference 
 For related ideas see Kawall (2013, 358 and on).61
 In cases in which the suspicions is true, the point in the text may not hold. Then again, in 62
those cases, it's not clear that the intuitions about doxastic wrongdoing are present either. See 
Moss’s (2018) related distinction between the costs of belief (applying whatever the belief ’s 
truth value) and the risks of belief (applying only if the belief is false).
 The point in the text here is not just phenomenologically loyal. It is also a matter of chari63 -
table interpretation. Reading the friend’s concern (that their friend not believe they behaved 
shamefully) as insensitive to the question whether the evidence supports this belief presents 
that concern in a less favorable light than the reading in the text. 
 There may be moral flaws in the vicinity, analogously to the moral flaws in the vicinity of 64
beliefs. Perhaps, for instance, sometimes there's something wrong about not even allowing 
oneself the opportunity to be attracted to someone (say, on morally objectionable grounds). 
But this is different. 
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or practical concern .  65
In this case, then, what we most care about is divorced from what amounts to a 
moral wrong, and this seems entirely acceptable . Perhaps this is so at least partly be66 -
cause the relevant care or concern is a mere wish. We want to suggest that something 
similar is going on in the case of purported doxastic wrongdoing (at least in the per-
sonal relationship examples): True, what you care about, perhaps more than other 
things, is that your partner not believe that you’re back drinking. But this is consistent 
with them not wronging you by so believing (when the evidence supports that belief), 
perhaps partly because your caring here amounts to a mere wish – wishing that the 
evidence didn’t indicate that you’re back drinking, so that your partner could – consis-
tently with the evidence – continue believing that you’re still strong.  
The analogy between the different cases is not perfect, of course. One impor-
tant difference is that in the case of your partner’s belief – and maybe also in Stroud’s 
friend case – an apology may be called for if the relevant belief is nonetheless formed. 
Not so in the attractiveness case (“I’m sorry, I’m just not attracted to you” is not exactly 
an apology, of course) . We do not belittle this difference. This is why we think of the 67
explanation here offered not as a vindicating account of the intuitions underlying 
thoughts about doxastic wrongdoing, but rather as a debunking explanation of sorts. 
There is another concern that seems to be doing important work in personal 
relationships examples of (purported) doxastic wrongdoing. We’ve been emphasizing 
that the phenomenologically more credible concern, the one that is seen in a more ra-
tionally favorable light, is the wish that the friend or partner believe well of me on the 
evidence, not ignoring it. But there are cases – perhaps the one we started with is one – 
where this is not the full picture. Perhaps, having told your partner that you’re not 
back drinking again, what you want and expect them to do is not just to believe that 
you’re not back drinking, but to believe you , to believe that you’re not back drinking 68
simply on your say-so. Perhaps you even think that they owe it to you to take your word 
for it, ignoring all other evidence.  
 There may be more practical desires – not mere wishes – to be found more attractive in 65
the future, and such desires may motivate action (say, to work on one's sense of humor). But if 
someone I care in this way about doesn’t now find me attractive, the wish that she did is a mere 
wish. 
 Another example: Perhaps I speak to you (or in some other way act towards you) in a 66
way that discloses absence of warmth that was once there. Perhaps my action, for whatever 
reason, is wrong. But perhaps what you regret most about it is that we are no longer as close as 
we once were. Surely, though, this can’t be what makes my action wrong. And indeed, at this 
point, your relevant concern looks like a mere wish (though perhaps an intensive one) – the 
wish that we hadn’t drifted apart.
 Basu (forthcoming) emphasizes the role of beliefs in partly constituting our relationships 67
with others as an explanation of how it is that beliefs can wrong. Note, though, that how at-
tractive we find each other also plays an important role in partly constituting our relationships 
with others. But no one wrongs another by failing to be attracted to them. So Basu’s explana-
tion here fails. 
 This takes center stage for Marusic and White (2018). We do not, however, accept their 68
Strawsonian understanding of this and related phenomena. 
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Whether this description – phenomenologically accurate though it is – can be 
made sense of depends on deeper issues we cannot get into here, like the epistemology 
of testimony, whether there is sense to be made of requests to believe, and more . 69
Some of the complications discussed throughout this paper may resurface: What, for 
instance, if inductive evidence suggests that your testimony on such things is far from 
reliable? Should your partner trust you against the evidence of your unreliability? And 
what if all the evidence including your fairly reliable testimony, considered together, 
still supports the belief that you’ve fallen off the wagon again. Are you then entitled to 
an apology?  Furthermore, to an extent this story can be accommodated without ac70 -
cepting doxastic wrongdoing – perhaps, for instance, the requirement to be believed is 
at least partly about your partner not continuing to seek further evidence after you 
spoke up, and a moral requirement not to seek more evidence is consistent with deny-
ing doxastic wrongdoing – it doesn’t place the wrongdoing in the belief itself. We also 
want to note that this story – in terms of believing the relevant person – can certainly 
not account for all of the cases that seem to exemplify doxastic wrongdoing. In many 
of those, the question of believing the person doesn’t even arise. So the answers to the 
questions about believing the person, while both interesting and relevant, cannot be 
the full story here.  
6. Politics, and the Epistemological Tradition: Conclusion  
Doxastic wrongdoing must be either modest (insisting that any morally unacceptable 
belief is also epistemically impermissible) or ambitious (accepting the possibility of 
morally wrong yet epistemically permissible or even required beliefs). Both alterna-
tives face serious, perhaps insurmountable problems. And the cases that serve to moti-
vate thoughts about doxastic wrongdoing can to a large extent be otherwise explained. 
We conclude, then, that beliefs do not in themselves wrong, that there is no such thing 
as doxastic wrongdoing. So your partner does not wrong you when they believe you’re 
back drinking.  
This is counterintuitive, but with the following points in mind, not too counter-
intuitive (given the problems with doxastic wrongdoing): While your partner doesn’t 
owe you not to believe that you’re back drinking, they may have a host of duties in the 
vicinity (like the duty to hear your out, to seek some evidence, not to continue seeking 
for evidence after you’ve denied, and so on). They may owe it to you not to be epistem-
ically negligent. And while the wish that they believe otherwise (on the evidence) 
makes perfect sense, it is a mere wish that things were otherwise. The belief itself does 
not wrong you, but it may harm you, and other things in the belief ’s vicinity may 
wrong you. This means that in some contexts there need be nothing problematic about 
 For testimony, see, for instance, Adler (2012). For requests to believe, see McMyler 69
(2015). 
 Notice that the relevant question here is whether you are entitled to an apology now, not 70
whether you can expect one in the future, when more evidence is in. Seeing that we often see 
an asymmetry between real-time and retroactive knowledge-attributions (think of “I knew my 
team would lose!”, when knowing that they’re going to lose would be strongly denied), this is 
not the same thing.    
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putting things in terms of the belief wronging you, in virtue of something else wrong-
ing you. Beliefs do not in themselves wrong you, and whatever is wrong with the belief 
is traceable to more purely epistemic problems (failures in the response to evidence, 
most clearly) and moral failures in the vicinity of the belief.  
And so, we find ourselves on the side of the epistemological tradition . Beliefs 71
are governed by epistemic considerations. Though for anything said here epistemology 
may be morally encroached on, still beliefs do not wrong. On this matter, no revolu-
tion is called for.  
 The literature on doxastic wrongdoing and on moral encroachment often gives 
the feeling that it is politically motivated: That, say, there’s no way of fully understand-
ing racism and accounting for its wrongness without deserting the more purist episte-
mological tradition. But this is not so, we think. There is a rich menu of other ways to 
understand – consistently with denying doxastic wrongdoing – what is going on with 
morally suspicious beliefs, and we’ve mentioned several in previous sections. Whether 
accepting doxastic wrongdoing helps with some important social struggles is, of 
course, an interesting (and empirical) question, one about which we do not have a 
view . Even if there are moral advantages to accepting doxastic wrongdoing, though, 72
this is not a reason – certainly not of the right kind – to believe that it is real. That, af-
ter all, is precisely the point.  
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